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VOEST-ALPINE TRADING V. BANK OF CHINA:
CAN A UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF A
"DIRECT EFFECT" BE ATTAINED UNDER THE
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
(FSIA) OF 1976?
The FSIA is a particularly enigmatic legislative creation,
called by one court "remarkably obtuse" and a "statutory
labyrinth that, owing to the numerous interpretive questions
engendered by its bizarre provisions and its many deliberately
vague provisions, has during its brief lifetime been a financial
boon for the private bar but a constant bane of the federal
judiciary)
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Hypothetical Case #1
Imagine a United States citizen and majority shareholder of the
Mexican corporation El Surtidor receiving a letter from the head of the
corporation describing an investment opportunity from which the
shareholder could obtain a substantial commission. 2 This letter also
explains that former members of the Nigerian party had used their
positions to create companies and over-invoiced contracts, and that the
new Nigerian government had allowed the payment of these contracts.
Further, the shareholder could receive a commission by arranging for the
payment of one of these contracts. The shareholder must provide blank
copies of El Surtidor's letterhead and invoice statements, as well as form
a non-Nigerian bank account into which 130 million dollars would be
transferred. After this transfer, nearly half of the funds would go to the
shareholder and the rest would go to the Nigerian government officials.
Assume that the shareholder accepts this agreement and two months
later agrees to the assignment of a Nigerian government contract. The
shareholder realizes that the underlying contract is between a foreign
company and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation for the

I Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1105-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), quoted in
Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir. 1985). For the legislative history of the
FSIA of 1976, see also infra notes 3247 and accompanying text.
2 This hypothetical case is loosely based on the facts of Adler v. FederalRepublic of Nigeria,
107 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997).
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computerization of certain Nigerian oil fields. In addition, the foreign
company has apparently finished the work, but has not received full
payment. The shareholder recognizes that Nigerian law permits the
contract with a foreign company. After receiving this information, the
shareholder provides the Federal Republic of Nigeria with copies of El
Surtidor's invoices and letterhead, and requests that the funds are
transferred to El Surtidor's bank account in the Cayman Islands.
The shareholder travels to Nigeria to finalize the agreement. After
signing the contract, Nigerian officials inform him that the funds cannot
be transferred until he pays a deposit of $570,000 to insure against a loss
in currency value during the transaction. The shareholder refuses to pay
and leaves the country; however, negotiations continue.
The
shareholder takes two more trips to Nigeria where he meets various
government officials, including Nigeria's Minister of Finance, and both
the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria. In
order to expedite the transaction, the shareholder eventually pays the
deposit amount, transfer fees, cable charges, taxes, surcharges, and
stamp duties that total over five million dollars.
Finally, the shareholder writes the Central Bank, instructing it to
transfer the funds to El Surtidor's bank account in New York, rather than
the account in the Cayman Islands. The money, however, is never paid
to the shareholder. As a result, the shareholder files a lawsuit against
Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation, and eighteen Nigerian citizens in a U.S. District Court. The
defendants claim that they are immune from the jurisdiction of the
United States court and move for dismissal. Does this transaction
directly affect the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act 3 in such a way that jurisdiction is warranted in a U.S. court?
B. Hypothetical Case #2
United World Trade, Inc. ("UWT") is a corporation organized under
the laws of Colorado with its principal place of business in Denver,
Colorado. 4 Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Association ("MOP") is an
enterprise under the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan and has

See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(2) (1994 & Supp. I1 1997) (commonly known as the "direct
effect" test of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976). See also infra notes 8-16 and
accompanying text.
4 This second hypothetical case is based on the fact in United World Trade, Inc. v.
Man gyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 1994).
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authority to produce oil by the Republic. The Kazakhstan Commerce
Foreign Economic Association ("Kazcom") is an entity under the laws of
Kazakhstan and acts as. an agent for MOP in all transactions. After a
protocol 5 agreement in 1991 and a later preliminary agreement, UWT
successfully completed its obligation to present a refinery specializing in
"Buzachi" oil that was acceptable to MOP. This refinery was an Italian
company in Sicily named "ISAB." Therefore, on January 23, 1992, UWT,
MOP, and Kazcom entered into an agreement in Moscow entitled
"Contract for Sale of Crude Oil." Under the contract, MOP supplied
UWT with 200,000 metric tons of oil during January, February, and
March of 1992. The method of payment to MOP was set forth in the
contract. 6 Basically, ISAB (Italy) received oil shipments from MOP, and
then forwarded payments to a London bank which later transferred the
funds to Citibank of New York to be converted into U.S. dollars.
Pursuant to the contract, the first two shipments of oil went
smoothly. The bill of lading 7 for the third shipment, however, was
apparently stolen from a Kazcom representative. This missing bill of
lading created potential liability for ISAB, the ultimate buyer of the oil,
and ISAB initially refused to release payment to UWT for the third
shipment. UWT secured release of payment from ISAB by issuing a
guaranty to indemnify ISAB against third party claims. After the third
shipment, MOP refused to supply any additional oil to UWT and began
selling oil directly to ISAB. Thereafter, United World Trade, Inc. files an
action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, asserting
four claims: breach of contract, anticipatory repudiation of the contract,
fraud and misrepresentation, and consequential damages. Does the

5 "Protocol" is defined as "[tihe rules of diplomatic etiquette; the practices that nations
observe in the course of their contacts with one another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1240
(7th ed. 1999).
6 According to the contract, the payment was scheduled as follows:
In U.S. Dollars by irrevocable documentary credit opened by a first
class European/USA bank and notified through advising bank, with
payment for Seller's account at thirty (30) calendar days from B/L date
against presentation of commercial invoice and other usual shipping
documents at bank counters. Letter of credit to be opened before
loading.
Latest day for documents/ LOI presentation 10.00 hrs A.M. Italian time
of three (3) working days prior to payment date, otherwise payment
will be effected three (3) working days after the presentation of
documents/LOI.
Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod.Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 1235.
7 "Bill of lading" is defined as "[a] document of title acknowledging the receipt of goods
by a carrier or by the shipper's agent ....
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 159 (7th ed. 1999).
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absence of a transfer and conversion of currency in the United States, as
well as the loss of profits and other harms to UWT directly affect the
United States in such a way that jurisdiction is warranted in a U.S. court?
C. Framework of Sovereign Immunity
Under the traditional framework of sovereign immunity, 8 federal
courts may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state in actions based
"upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with
a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
direct effect in the United States." 9 Further, some courts interpret that
U.S. law only applies to overseas state action whose conduct has a
"substantial" effect in the U.S. as a direct and foreseeable result of this
conduct outside the territory of the United States. 10 The doctrine of
sovereign immunity is one of a number of doctrines that attempts to
regulate the relations between states." Consequently, the "direct effect"
test set forth by Congress in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA") of 197612 has not been interpreted uniformly since its

"Foreign Sovereign Immunity" is the immunity of a foreign sovereign, its agents, or its
instrumentalities from litigation in U.S. courts. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 297 (6th ed.

1996). For a more complete explanation of the evolution of foreign sovereign immunity in
the United States, see also infra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
9 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).

10 RESATEMENT

(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE US. § 18(b)(ii-iii) (1965)

(stating that the FSIA interpretation of the "direct effect" test should be that an effect is
direct when it is substantial and foreseeable).
11 See also Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6A (West Supp. 1990); Clayton Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. § 22 (1994). These statutes also attempt to regulate the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law over foreign defendant's through an "effects" doctrine. See also infra notes 113-135
and accompanying text.
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 111997). The "direct test" states:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
DIRECT EFFECT in the United States. (emphasis added)
Id.
For the legislative history of the FSIA and restrictive theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
in the United States, see also infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
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inception. 13 Some courts apply a broad view of "direct effect" by literally
interpreting the statute,14 while other courts embrace a more narrow
view of "direct effect" that adds additional requirements such as
substantiality, foreseeability, and a legally significant act that determine
whether an act is direct.1 5 Accordingly, one court aptly summarized
"that Congress did not intend to provide jurisdiction whenever the
ripples caused by an overseas transaction manage eventually to reach the
shores of the United States." 16
D. The "Direct Effect" Test of the FSIA of 1976 and Voest-Alpine vs. the
"Direct Effect" Test of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982 ("FTAIA") & Sherman Act.
This Note identifies a significant concern with the application of the
"direct effect" test in light of the Circuit split caused by Voest-Alpine
Trading v. Bank of China'7 and introduces a proposed statute to provide

13

See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) (applying an

"immediate consequence" test for direct effect); Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio &
Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that the foreign state's activities had
a "significant, foreseeable" effect, constituting a "direct effect", in the U.S.).
14 See, e.g., Voest-Alpine v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 8% (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that a
"direct effect" is all a plaintiff needs to establish jurisdiction in the U.S., without explaining
what the language "direct effect" means besides citing Weltover); see also Weltover, 504 U.S.
at 618 (applying a broad view of jurisdiction by stating that any act with an immediate
consequence in the United States is a "direct effect").
15 See, e.g., Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720, 727 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997)
(stating that the Second Circuit often recognizes that something legally significant must
actually happen in the United States to satisfy jurisdiction under the FSIA "direct effect"
test); Antares v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 36 (2nd Cir. 1993) (adopting a
legally significant act analysis and stating that Weltover implied a similar analysis); General
Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1385 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts
often look to the place where legally significant acts occurred); Kao Hwa Shipping Co. v.
China Steel Corp., 816 F. Supp. 910, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that, in determining
where the effect of a defendant's conduct is felt directly, courts often look to the place
where legally significant acts giving rise to the claim occurred).
16 United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1238 (10th
Cir. 1994); See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 490 .(1983)
(stating that courts must interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) in light of the Congressional
purpose of ensuring access of U.S. citizens to the courts). While it is true that the FSIA was
passed with such a purpose of ensuring access to U.S. courts, Congress was also concerned
that "our courts [might be] turned into small 'international courts of claims'.. open... to
all comers to litigate any dispute which any private party may have with a foreign state
anywhere in the world." Id. See generally Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,312 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that finding the site of financial
harm to a plaintiff under the FSIA is "an enterprise fraught with artifice").
17 142 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 1998) (causing a significant Circuit split (1-5) by discarding the
"legally significant" act standard from its analysis of direct effect under the FSIA).
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future courts with a more narrowly tailored test for "direct effect" under
the FSIA.18 This Note advocates that the courts should use new language
in the statutory "direct effect" test of the FSIA in order to promote
uniformity among the Circuit Courts and prevent confusion with the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act' 9 and the Sherman Act's
"direct effect" test.20 Section II will provide background on the
development of sovereign immunity, the enactment of the FSIA, and the
application of the "direct effect" exception in courts until the present.21
Section III of this Note will reveal the recent split in the Circuit Court's
application of the FSIA "direct effect" test through detailed analysis of
the Voest-Alpine decision and discussion of problems with that
interpretation. 22 Section IV will detail the history of the "effects" test of
the Sherman Act23 and the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
198224 and provide insights for the interpretation of the Voest-Alpine
"effects" test.25 Finally, Section V will propose a model statute that will
provide the courts with a more specific test that will prevent U.S. courts
from becoming small international courts of claims and prevent
confusion with the "effects" test of the Sherman Act and the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA).26 Through a narrowly
tailored test that more clearly articulates the "direct effect" exception,

IsSee infra notes 145-72 and accompanying text. Specifically, this Note suggests an
incorporation of the "legally significant" act standard into the language of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities "direct effect" test in the statute. See infra notes 173-84 and
accompanying text. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
19 For a discussion of the similarity between the FSIA's effects test requirements of
"substantiality" and "foreseeability" and the effects test of the FTAIA and Sherman Act's
"direct effect" test that may be confusing courts today, see infra notes 133-35 and
accompanying text.
20 For a description of the Sherman Act's "direct effects" test that may be confusing the
court's analysis of "direct effect" under the FSIA, see infra notes 113-32 and accompanying
text.
21 For a discussion of the various interpretations of direct effect in courts today and the
development of the theory of sovereign immunity that is codified in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, see infra notes 27-85 and accompanying text.
22 For an analysis of the Fifth Circuit's confusion in the application of "direct effect" under
the FSIA, see infra notes 86-113 and accompanying text. This return to a Weltover
"immediate consequences" analysis caused a split among Circuits about how to correctly
apply the phrase "direct effect" to establish jurisdiction under the FSIA of 1976.
23 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
24 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6A (West Supp. 1990).
25 For a discussion of the "direct effects" test of the Sherman Act and FTAIA that includes
elements of "substantiality" and "foreseeability," see infra notes 114-36 and accompanying
text.
26 See infra notes 137-89 and accompanying text. This revised statute includes the "legally
significant" act interpretation of the FSIA. Id.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol34/iss3/4

Frostestad: Voest-Alpine Trading v. Bank of China: Can a Uniform Interpretati

2000]

FSIA - "DIRECT EFFECT"

521

U.S. courts will not become subject to foreign suits with tenuous causal
connections.
II.HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

OF VOEST-ALPINE

Before analyzing the problems of a recent court's interpretation of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act in Voest-Alpine, a brief overview of
the evolution of sovereign immunity, including the theories of absolute
immunity and restrictive immunity, is necessary in order to understand
the complexity of this historic doctrine. In addition, the various
interpretations of "direct effect" under the FSIA reveal a stark lack of
uniformity among Circuit Courts in the past, as well as today.
A. The Theory of Absolute Immunity
The origin of the American doctrine of sovereign immunity dates to
several ancient doctrines. For example, some legal scholars date
sovereign immunity to medieval domestic doctrines of "the king can do
no wrong" and "the sovereign cannot be a defendant in its own
courts." 27 Others scholars trace sovereign immunity to Roman legal
concepts such as "equals do not have jurisdiction of [sic] each other." 28
The theory of absolute immunity for foreign sovereigns provides that a
state enjoys complete immunity from the adjudicatory jurisdiction of
other states. 29 Courts in the United States first implemented this theory
in the famous case of Schooner v. McFadden.30 In Schooner, Chief Justice
Marshall stated that a nation has exclusive jurisdiction over its own

See Foreign Sovereign hninnnities Act of 1976-Judicial Predominance, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L
LAW 146, 147 (1977); Jeffrey N. Martin, Sovereign hnrunity - Limits of Judicial Control-The
Foreign Sovereign inmnunities Act of 1976, 18 HARv. INT'L LJ.429,431 n.1 (1977) ("Sovereign
immunity appears to have been derived from the rule par in parent non habet imnperiurn - no
State can claim jurisdiction over another. The phrase was most likely coined in the 14th
century by Bartolus, one of the first writers on international law.").
2 See, e.g., Stella Havkin, Note, Te Foreign Sovereign imnunities Act: The Relationship
Between the Commercial Activity Exception and the Noncommnercial Tort Exception in Light of De
Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L.REV. 455 n.1 (1987).
Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" out of the Foreign Sovereign Inmunities Act: A
FunctionalApproach to the Comnmercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489, 490 (1992).
- 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (involving jurisdiction over a foreign vessel coming into
U.S.ports).
27
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territory, subject to no limitations.31 The purpose of sovereign immunity
is to provide protection to public officials who conduct business
negotiations abroad. 32 This rule applied in the British and American
courts throughout the nineteenth century. 33 Meanwhile, continental
Europe developed a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity because
absolute immunity inhibited business and other commercial relations
with foreign sovereigns by not providing any sort of legal recourse. 34 In
subsequent years, especially the first half of the twentieth century, the
absolute theory came .under severe attack in the United States and
Britain, resulting in the adoption of a restrictive theory of foreign
sovereign immunity in the United States. 35
B. The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity emerged because of the
increased participation of governments in commercial activities after
World War II.3 6 It recognizes that governments often act in a commercial
rather than governmental capacity. 37 When acting in such a commercial
capacity, the foreign government of one nation should be in no better

Id. at 136 ("The jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by its self."). This is the first
case that establishes sovereign immunity for foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts. Id. Marshall
also stated:
The perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this
common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an
interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class
of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise
of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has
been stated to be the attribute of every nation.
Id. at 137.
32 Id. at 137 (stating that foreign officials should not have to worry about being subject to
foreign law, especially if a majority of their conduct occurs in their own state).
-3 Donoghue, supra note 29, at 496 n.26.
34 Havkin, supra note 28, at 459 ("[Absolute immunity] deprived private citizens
conducting business with foreign governments of a legal remedy in any court."). See
generally Donoghue, supra note 29, at 496.
35 See ]urisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings Before the Subcomnm.
on Adninistrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 54 (1976) [hereinafter "Hearings"] (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal
Advisor, Department of State) (stating that this shift to the restrictive theory may have been
motivated because of an animosity toward the Soviet Union in the post-World War I
period); see generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976).
36 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6607 (1976).
37 See generally Donoghue, supra note 29, at 496; Havkin, supranote 28, at 459.
31
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38
position than any other nation in the international marketplace.
According to the Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Law and Governmental Relations in 1976, "[wlhen a foreign state enters
the marketplace or when it acts as a private party, there is no justification
in modem international law for allowing the foreign state to avoid the
economic costs of the agreements which it may breach or the accidents
which it may cause." 39 In 1952, the State Department announced its
acceptance of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in what is
labeled as the Tate Letter.40 Under the provisions of the Tate Letter, the
State Department, not the courts, decided disputes involving sovereign
immunity.41
The letter also accorded foreign sovereign officials
immunity for claims resulting from sovereign or public acts but refused
42
immunity for any claims arising from private or commercial activities.
The State Department often yielded to diplomatic and political pressure
from foreign states and recommended immunity where, under the

3 Havkin, supra note 28, at 459-60. This is also in accordance with notions of comity. See
infra note 130.
39 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6605 (1976) (stating that under the restrictive theory,
immunity is granted only with respect to causes of action arising out of a foreign state's
governmental acts-called activities jure imnperii-and not with respect to those arising out of
its commercial or proprietary acts, or other acts which are governed by private law, socalled activities jure gestionis); see also Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the
Secretary of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), in H.R.
REP. No. 94-1487, at 6607 (1976) [hereinafter "Tate Letter"], which announces a change in
U.S. policy from the absolute to the restrictive theory.
40 Tate Letter, sutpra note 39, at 6607.
41 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6607 (stating that the State Department undertook to decide future sovereign immunity
questions by asking the Department of Justice to make suggestions of immunity to the
courts in appropriate cases that caused the courts "a number of difficulties"). The most
significant problem with the application of the restrictive theory was that the foreign state
could elect to raise its immunity defense either in the court in which it had been sued, or by
making a formal diplomatic request to have the State Department decide the issue, and if
appropriate, to make a suggestion of immunity to the court. Id. This process placed the
State Department in the "awkward position of a political institution trying to apply a legal
standard to litigation already before the courts." Id. Whenever the State Department
requested immunity on behalf of a foreign state, the request was granted in favor of
immunity. Id. This reflects the rule of Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), in which U.S.
courts automatically deferred to suggestions of immunity from the executive branch
without making separate determinations of law or fact. See also 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6606.
42 H.R. REP. No. 1487, at 6607 (stating that such a private party could not be certain that
jurisdiction over the foreign governmental entity would not "be decided on the basis of
nonlegal considerations through the foreign government's intercession with the
Department of State"). See also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 703 (1976).
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restrictive principle, immunity should have been denied.43 As a result,
these inconsistencies of the State Department and the ensuing chaotic
state of affairs led to the enactment of the FSIA in 1976.
C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
Congress codified the law of sovereign immunity in 1976 with the
passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.44 Congress stated its
goals in enacting the FSIA as: (a) codifying the principle of restrictive
sovereign immunity; (b) insuring that sovereign immunity decisions
were judicial rather than executive; (c) providing a method for service of
process on foreign state defendants; and (d) establishing a method for
satisfying in personam judgments. 5 Even though the general rule of the
FSIA is that foreign officials are immune from the jurisdiction of U.S.
federal courts, the statute contains several important exceptions that
codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 46 Thus, in certain
matters, the judiciary denies sovereign immunity based on the criteria
stated in the statute.47 Accordingly, the FSIA is the only vehicle for
asserting jurisdiction by a U.S. federal court over a foreign state.48
The restrictive theory is codified in the FSIA at section 1605(a)(2). 49
The focus of this Note is the third clause of section 1605(a)(2) that reveals

Case Digest, Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta and the IDA of Ireland, 10 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 255,261 (1984).
4

H.R. 11315 was passed by the House of Representatives on September 29, 1976. 122
CONG. REC., in H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976); see also Martin, supra note 27, at 429 n.2
(revealing that the FSIA was originally introduced in 1973 at the urging of the State and
Justice Departments, then withdrawn for reconsideration). A revised bill was reintroduced
in 1975, passed by the House and Senate in 1976, and became effective on January 19,1977,
90 days after it was signed by President Ford. Martin, supra note 27, at 429 n.1-2.
15H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 36, at 6605-06; see also Havkin, supra note 28, at 462.
46 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994) ("A foreign state shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter."). The FSIA starts from a premise of
immunity and then creates exceptions to the general principle. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at
6616. Immunity is generally obtained for acts jure inperil, but not for activities jure gestionis.
Martin, supra note 27, at 437-38.
47 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994). The courts, however, have not been able to attain a uniform
interpretation as to what constitutes a "direct effect" in the United States. See infra notes 5285 and accompanying text.
48 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989). The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides that "district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
49 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988) states:
44
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United States jurisdiction: "an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States."50 Often
referred to as the commercial activities exception, the United States
Supreme Court has referred to section 1605(a)(2) as an important
exception because it promotes business relations and commercial activity
abroad.5 1 Courts, however, after the 1976 enactment, interpreted the
"direct effect" clause in varying ways. The Second Circuit stated the
central issue of the statute in this way, "[Was the effect sufficiently
"direct" and sufficiently "in the United States" that Congress would
have wanted an American court to hear the case?", and concluded that
52
the direct effect portion of the FSIA was hard to interpret consistently.
D. Interpretationof the "Direct Effect" Clause Until Weltover
1. Examining the Legislative History of the "Direct Effect" Clause
The legislative history recognizes the meaning of clause three of
section 1605(a)(2) as limited in scope and also reveals that clause three
should be consistent with the principles of Section 18 of the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law. 3 Even though this is a brief statement

(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case-

(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.
Id.
50 Id.

Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992) (referring to section
1605 (a)(2) as "[t]he most significant of the FSIA's exceptions").
52 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 311-13 (2d
Cir. 1981).
53 House Report 94-1487 explains:
The third situation-"an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere
and that act causes a direct effect in the United States"-would embrace
commercial conduct abroad having direct effects within the United
States which would subject such conduct to the exercise of jurisdiction
by the United States consistent with the principles set forth in section
18, Restatement of the Law, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (1965).
51
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of Congressional intent, it seems clear that the interpretation of the
"direct effect" test in the FSIA should be consistent with the principles
articulated in Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations.54
By looking to this section of the Restatement, the judiciary may find
principles that are capable of assisting courts in determining when an
effect is "sufficiently direct" such that the assertion of jurisdiction
coincides with the intent of Congress. For example, section 18,
Jurisdictionto Prescribewith Respect to Effect within Territory, provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs
outside its territory and causes an effect within its
territory, if...

(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent
elements of activity to which the rule applies;
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of
the conduct outside the territory; and
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the
principles of justice generally recognized by
states that have reasonably developed legal
systems.5

The principles that are evident in section 18 require that an effect,
which is felt in the United States as the result of extraterritorial conduct,
is substantial, direct, and foreseeable. Further, these principles are
supported by comment f in the Restatement which states that conduct
must be substantial and foreseeable as a causal relationship before
jurisdiction can be asserted.56 Because there is a clear statement of
Congressional intent on the interpretation of the "direct effect" clause, it
is difficult to imagine that a court could interpret "direct effect" without

Id.
at 6618.
5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
(1965).
55 Id. at § 18(b).
56 Id. at cnt. f (explaining that subsection b is "more than a mere causal relationship: the
effect within the territory must be substantial and occur as a direct and foreseeable result of
the conduct outside the territory" and "exercise oi jurisdiction under the rule stated in
clause (b) of this Section generally involves matters of an economic nature"). It could be
inferred that "matters of an economic nature" is equivalent with "commercial activity"
which is the concept that is essential in FSIA jurisdiction over states whose activities occur
outside the territory but have effects within another territory. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(2)
(1988).
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including the elements of substantiality and foreseeability as required in
the Restatement.5 7 In Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of

Nigeria,58 however, the court did not think that the relationship between
the FSIA "effects" test and the Restatement should be validated because
the FSIA concerns the application of substantive American law to
conduct abroad.5 9 Therefore, many courts have been confused on the
application of the "direct effect" exception of the FSIA and its
relationship to the principles set forth in the Restatement of Foreign
Relations.63 This confusion is evident in the court decisions after the
enactment of the FSIA and its commercial exceptions.
2. The Substantial and Foreseeable Test-A Pre-Weltover Case Analysis
After the 1976 enactment of the FSIA, most Circuit Courts adopted a
"substantial and foreseeable" test. The two views adopted by the
Circuits have been described as the "broad view," adopted by the
Second Circuit in Texas Trading and the "narrow view," developed by the
remaining five Circuits that considered foreign sovereign immunity
cases brought under clause three of the commercial activities exception. 61
The "narrow view," adopting the "substantiality" and "foreseeability"
requirements, was first adopted by a court in the eastern district of New
York in Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 62 which many other Circuits
followed. 63 By contrast, the Second Circuit, beginning with Texas

For an explanation why additional clauses such as "substantiality", "foreseeability", or a
"legally significant act" are necessary in the interpretation of the vague articulation of
"direct effect" under the FSIA, see infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text and 71-85 and
accompanying text.
s 647 F.2d 300,311 (2d Cir. 1981).
5 Id. The Texas Trading court defined the relationship as" a bit of a non sequitur, since [it]
concerns the extent to which substantive American law may be applied to conduct
overseas, not the proper extraterritorial jurisdictional reach of American courts ..."" Id.
This interpretation, though, is difficult to imagine because the statute states that it should
adhere to the terms of the Restatement that includes the elements of "substantiality" and
"foreseeability" to determine "direct effect".
60 See infra notes 60-85 and accompanying text.
61 See Nicholas J. Evanoff, Direct Effect Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign hnImunities
Act of 1976: Ending the Chaos in the Circuit Courts, 28 Hous. L. REv. 629, 639 (1991). The
rejection by the Second Circuit of the requirements of substantiality and foreseeability is
the "broad view" and the "narrow view" refers to those Circuits which retain the
requirements of substantiality and foreseeability. Id. at 639-40.
62 481 F. Supp. 1056,1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that "direct effect" requires a substantial
impact in the United States that is a directly foreseeable result of the extraterritorial act).
613See America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 799 (9th Cir. 1989)
(stating that "a foreign sovereign's activities must cause an effect in the United States that is
substantial and foreseeable in order to abrogate sovereign immunity"); Gould, Inc. v.
57
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Trading, declined to consider the substantiality or foreseeability of the
effect when deciding if the effect was sufficiently "direct" to support
jurisdiction under the FSIA. 64 Thus, the Texas Trading court expressly
rejected the "substantial and foreseeable" test, which was adopted in a
majority of other Circuit Courts, and created a Circuit split that was
reconciled by the United States Supreme Court in Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover.65 The Court in Weltover created a new standard that clearly
departed from past decisions.
3. The "Direct Effect" Test Applied in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover"6
From 1979 until 1991, the Circuits struggled with the meaning of the
language, "direct effect in the United States" under the FSIA. 67 In 1992,
the U.S. Supreme Court issued the highly criticized opinion of Weltover.
The Court determined in Weltover that "an effect is 'direct' if it follows

Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445,453 (6th Cir. 1988) (revealing that economic injury
to a U.S. corporation is "direct" if the corporation is the injury is a significant financial
consequence and if the result of the conduct is foreseeable); Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (applying section 18's "substantial" and
"foreseeable" test to reject the claim); Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415,418 (5th
Cir. 1987) (stating that "(t)he substantial and direct and foreseeable" standards set forth in
section 18 of the Restatement are likewise intended to apply in commercial contexts");
Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that conduct must have a
'substantial' effect in the United States as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct
outside the United States according to the court); Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735
F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that effects of murder of wife and children on plaintiff
in Iran was "not sufficiently direct or substantial" to support Federal jurisdiction);
Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1111 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (holding that anticipated lost profits caused by a contract breach were not
foreseeable and did not constitute a "direct effect in the United States"; the court also
adopted the substantiality and foreseeability requirements by looking to section 18 of the
Restatement); Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1351
(11th Cir. 1982) (affirming jurisdiction over Iran under the "direct effect" clause of the FSIA
and holding that the foreign state's activities had "significant, foreseeable.. . consequences
in the United States").
1 See Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 311 n.32 (referring to Congress's reference to section 18 as
"a bit of a non sequitur"). "Non sequitur" means "it does not follow." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 442 (6th ed. 1996).
6 753 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), affd, 504 U.S. 607
(1992).
- 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
67 See Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding
that the Restatement's elements of "substantiality" and "foreseeability" should be applied
when interpreting "direct effect" under the FSIA); See also Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de
Contratos del Comite Ejecutivo General del Sindicato Revolucionario de Trabajadores
Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana, S.C., 923 F.2d 380, 390 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that
some courts have equated 'direct effect' with a corporate plaintiff's financial loss).
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'as an immediate consequence of the defendant's... activity"' and
specifically rejected the suggestion in legislative history that an effect
must be both "substantial" and "foreseeable" to be "direct." 68 According
to some critics, this decision muddied the decision of other Circuits and
ignored the intent of Congress. 69 By declining to apply the substantiality
and foreseeability requirements, the Supreme Court established a
significantly more lenient test for plaintiffs. This new "immediate
consequences" test from Weltover leaned towards granting jurisdiction
rather than preserving sovereign immunity. 70 Certainly, the Court's
interpretation of the "direct effect" exception under the FSIA as an
"immediate consequences" analysis confused the Circuits after its
issuance and still confuses courts today.
4. "Direct Effect" Application in Circuit Courts After Weltover
The application of the direct effect clause of the commercial activities

exception of the FSIA has been varied and unpredictable and, in many
court decisions, courts have implied that the "immediate consequences"
test is a failure71 For example, the Tenth Circuit in United World Trade,

ma Weltover, 504 U.S. at 616. See also H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 37, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6618 for legislative history.
69 See David E. Gohlke, Comment, Clearing the Air or Muddying the Waters? Defining a
"Direct Effect in the United States" Under the Foreign Sovereign Inmunities Act After Republic
of Argentina v. Weltover, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 261, 283 (1995) (criticizing Weltover because
of the.new "immediate consequences" test that grants broad jurisdiction over foreign
officials in U.S. courts).
70 Keith Highet et al., Foreign Sovereign imunity - Commercial Activity of a Foreign State
Having a Direct Effect in the United States, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 820, 823 (1992) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's acceptance in Weltover of an "immediate consequences" test will result in
"a considerable broadening of the commercial activity exception..."); see also Steven
Anthony Torres, International Law - Foreign Sovereign Imunities Act - Argentina's Default on
Bonds Payable in New York Found Sufficient to Deny Immunity; Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of
Argentina, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991); 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 761, 771 (1993)
(arguing that the immediate consequences test "will perpetuate both inconsistency and
misunderstanding in future interpretations of the FSIA's direct effect clause").
7 Gohlke, supra note 69, at 285. See Janini v. Kuwait Univ., 43 F.3d 1534, 1537 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (stating that loss of employment contract because of the Gulf War was in connection
with a commercial activity outside the U.S. which had a direct effect in the U.S.);
Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying
broad interpretation of Weltover and concluding that the bank's obligation to remit funds to
other New York accounts is a direct effect in the U.S.); Antares Aircraft v. Federal Rep. of
Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying a "legally significant act" analysis to
determine direct effect); Ampac Group, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973, 977
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (applying the broad Weltover view of "direct effect", but stating that the
effect only needs to be "slight" or "tangential"); United World Trade v. Mangyshlakneft Oil
Prod. Ass'n, 821 F. Supp. 1405 (D. Colo. 1993), affd 33 F.3d 1232, 1238 (10th Cir. 1994)
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Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil ProductionAss'n 72 commented on the vagueness
of the "direct effect" test and added the "legally significant act"
requirement to its analysis. 3 This "legally significant act" analysis
requires a plaintiff to show that some legally significant act occurred in
the United States which causes a direct effect in order to qualify for
jurisdiction in the U.S. courts.7 4 By requiring a "legally significant act"
standard in the interpretation of the FSIA, the Mangyshlakneft court
hoped to prevent tenuous claims against foreign defendants and
encourage business and contractual relations overseas. 75 Further, the
Second Circuit added a "legally significant act" requirement in Antares
Aircraft v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,76 followed by the Circuit thereafter,
that is more restrictive than the "immediate consequence" standard. 77
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit and Eighth Circuit added the legally
significant act requirement to the direct effect interpretation in Adler v.
79
Federal Republic of Nigeria78 and General Electric Capital Corp. v. Grossman.
Overall, other district and Circuit courts have had difficulty
applying the broad standard of "immediate consequences" in the context
of the FSIA's "direct effect" exception and embraced the "legally
significant act" requirement as a more coherent standards ° In order to

(rejecting the "slight and tangential" test of Ampac and noting that the phrase "direct
effect" is very ambiguous).
- 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994).
73 Id. at 1238 (revealing no direct effect by applying legally significant act standard even'
though domestic corporation did not receive funds).
71 Id.
75 Id. For a discussion of the application of the "legally significant act" test, see inifra notes
166-77 and accompanying text. Overall, this test produces the most cogent results in its
"narrow" grant of jurisdiction.
- 999 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
77 Id. (stating that the legally significant act requirement is similar to the Weltover analysis);
See also Richard Wydeven, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: A Contemporan Look
at Jurisdiction under the Comnercial Activity Exception, 13 REv. LrmG. 143, 166 (1993) (arguing
that the Second Circuit's "legally significant acts" methodology is more restrictive than an
"immediate consequences" standard).
78 107 F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that Nigeria's nonpayment of government
contract assigned to plaintiff had a direct effect in the U.S. based on a legally significant
act).
991 F.2d 1376, 1385 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that G.E.'s claim was too speculative based
on a legally significant act analysis).
1 For Circuits that have applied the legally significant act requirement, see Adler v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that something "legally
significant" must occur in the United States for a grant of jurisdiction under the FSIA);
McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that
there must be sufficient contact in the United States for jurisdiction); Goodman Holdings v.
Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (denying jurisdiction because of a lack of
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establish direct effect under this analysis, the plaintiff must show that
something legally significant actually happened in the United States,81
instead of the "immediate consequence" standard of Weltover8 2 that is
quite ambiguous. 83 From such consistent analysis since Antares Aircraft
of adding a "legally significant act" requirement to the direct effect test,
it is difficult to imagine that a court would again reject this analysis and
4
return to a broad Weltover view of the direct effect test under the FSIA.8
However, a significant departure from the analysis of a majority of the

direct effect); Princz v. F. R. G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (applying notions of jus

cogens with the interpretation of a legally significant act under the FSIA's "direct effect"
analysis); Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard Rubin, 12 F.3d 1270, 1286 (3rd Cir. 1993) (stating that
the plaintiff's actions were not based upon legally significant acts in the United States);
General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1385 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that
courts often look to the place where legally significant acts occurred); Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 710 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that actions must cause a
substantial and foreseeable effect in the United States); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales v.
Republic of the Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375, 1386 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying the Zernticek test
which requires substantial contact with the United States); WMW Machinery v.
Werkzeugmaschinenhandd, 960 F. Supp. 734, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying the "legally
significant act" test to determine sufficient contact with the United States); Granville Gold
Trust v. Commissione del Fullimento/Interchange Bank, 924 F. Supp. 397, 407 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (revealing that a commercial act must have substantial contact with the United States
under the FSIA); Coleman v. Alcolac, 888 F. Supp. 1388, 1402 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that
plaintiff's injuries didn't have a significant connection with the United States); Reed v.
Donau Bank, 866 F. Supp. 750, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the legally significant act
standard applies in FSIA cases); Kao Hwa Shipping Co. v. China Steel Corp., 816 F.Supp.
910, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (determining direct effect based upon the place of legally
significant acts); Maizus v. Weldor Trust Reg., 820 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(adopting a Texas Trading standard for direct effect and denying jurisdiction).
81 For example, many courts interpret that a legally significant act in the United States
cannot include contracts that only have performance in a New York bank like the case of
Weltover. In addition, under a legally significant act standard, a majority of the contractual
acts must occur in the United States. This is a more narrow view of granting jurisdiction
than that employed in Weltover's immediate consequence standard.
82 For example, the Weltover court crafted a test of "direct effect" that relied upon an
"immediate consequence" within the United States. This "immediate consequences"
analysis grants jurisdiction in cases that may have a majority of acts occurring outside the
United States if the act has an effect in the United States. For instance, in Weltover, the
performance of a contract at a New York bank was enough to grant jurisdiction over the
defendant in the United States even though a majority of the contractual acts occurred
outside the United States. Therefore, this approach grants broad jurisdiction over foreign
defendants in the United States and will subject our court system to many claims, no
matter how distant the acts involved.
83 See Adler, 107 F.3d at 726-27 (showing direct effect through a legally significant act); see
also Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1527 (9th Cir. 1989) (establishing direct effect by
first showing that something legally significant occurred in the United States).
For a discussion of the legally significant act standard, see supra notes 73-83 and
accompanying text.
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Circuits occurred recently in Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of
China.85 The Fifth Circuit again confused the interpretation of the FSIA
and discarded the "legally significant act" test.
III. VOEST-ALPINE TRADING - ANOTHER CIRCUIT SPLIT ON "DIRECT EFFECT"

In June of 1998, in Voest-Alpine the Fifth Circuit held that the "direct
effect" exception to the FSIA does not require the defendant to have
engaged in a "legally significant act" in the U.S.86 Thus, the court
rejected prior decisions of the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
on this issue of the exceptions to sovereign immunity by foreign states
which have a direct effect on the United States. 87 This new broad
interpretation, rejecting the narrower interpretations of other Circuits,
further signifies the vagueness of the FSIA and causes our courts to
become international courts of claims. In addition, this Circuit split is
likely to further confuse courts in the future until a uniform
interpretation is attained.
A. Discussion of Voest-Alpine
In June 1995, Voest-Alpine USA Corporation ("Voest-Alpine"), a
New York corporation with its principal place of business in Houston,
Texas, agreed to sell many tons of styrene monomer to the Jiangyin
Foreign Trade Corporation (JFTC) for $1,000 USD per metric ton.88 As
security for performance of JFTC's payment, the Bank of China issued an
irrevocable letter of credit.8 9 The letter of credit referred to JFTC as the

8 142 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 1998).
8 Id. at 894. The Voest-Alpine court held that a financial loss occurred in the United States
through a non-payment of funds to New York. Id. at 896. The court applied an
"immediate consequences" test that is similar to Weltover. Id. at 897.
87 See Adler, 107 F.3d at 720; United World Trade v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod., 33 F.3d
1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 1994) (concluding no direct effect because the domestic corporation
did not receive funds); Antares Aircraft v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 999 F.2d 33, 36 (2d

Cir. 1993) (declining jurisdiction under FSIA because all legally significant acts occurred
outside the U.S.); General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1385 (8th Cir.
1993) (applying legally significant act test). See also Kao Hwa Shipping Co. v. China Steel
Corp., 816 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Maizus v. Weldor Trust Reg., 820 F. Supp. 101
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); and WMW Machinery v. Werkzeugmaschinenhandd, 960 F. Supp. 734
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). These three decisions apply the legally significant act standard in
association with the "direct effect" test under FSIA.
88 Id. The shipment was to be delivered by July 1995 to China. Id.
89 Id. An "irrevocable letter of credit" is a letter of credit that is "unalterable; committed
beyond recall." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 340 (6th ed. 1996).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol34/iss3/4

Frostestad: Voest-Alpine Trading v. Bank of China: Can a Uniform Interpretati

2000]

FSIA - "DIRECT EFFECT"

533

applicant and Voest-Alpine as the beneficiary. 90 It did not specify a
particular place of payment, but the Bank of China promised to pay
Voest-Alpine the appropriate amount. 91 After many communications
between TCB and Voest-Alpine to maintain the conformity of the
documents, the Bank of China informed TCB that JFTC refused payment
and the documents would be returned. 92 Then, the present legal dispute
ensued. 93
Voest-Alpine brought action against the Bank of China for a breach
of letter of credit issued as security for performance of a Chinese
payment obligation. 94 The Bank of China alleged that it was immune
from the action under the FSIA. 95 The District Court, however, held that
the Bank of China's failure to remit funds into the corporation's bank
account in the United States caused a direct effect in the United States;
therefore, jurisdiction over the action pursuant to the FSIA was proper. %
B. The Fifth Circuit'sAnalysis of Voest-Alpine.
By looking to the FSIA which sets forth the exclusive standards by
which all disputes should be settled, the court determined that the
analysis turned on the third prong, namely the "direct effect" test.97 The

Bank of China contended that the district court erred in finding
jurisdiction through the "direct effect" test because the United States was

neither the place of payment nor the place of any other "legally
significant act,"

as required by Weltover and subsequent cases.98

90 Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 890. Although this agreement did not designate a specific place
of payment, it was to be governed by the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits of the International Chamber of Commerce. Id.
9' Id. The agreement was adequately negotiated by both parties through letters of credit.
Id.
9 Id.
93Id. Voest-Alpine filed the action seeking damages for the breach of the letter of credit.
Id.
91 Voest-Alpine, 142 F.2d at 890.
95 Id. at 891. The district court denied the defendant's claim of immunity and granted
jurisdiction under the "direct effect" test of the FSIA. Id.
% Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this holding. Id. at 890.
9 Id. at 892; see also Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1992)
(stating that the FSIA sets forth 'the sole and exclusive standards to be used' to resolve all
sovereign immunity issues raised in federal and state courts); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)
(1988) which articulates that the exception must be related to a foreign state's commercial
activity.
" Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 893. According to the Voest-Alpine court, though, the legally
significant act requirement was renounced by Weltover. Id. This interpretation, however,
does not explain why many courts adopted a "legally significant act" interpretation of
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However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
reasoning by stating that an effect is sufficient to support jurisdiction
under the commercial activity exception so long as it is "direct," without
any other modifying adjectives such as foreseeability, substantiality, or
legal significance." The court further reasoned that a financial loss
sustained in the United States by an American plaintiff may constitute a
direct effect which supports jurisdiction under the commercial activity
exception of the FSIA. 100 The Bank of China urged the court, however, to
interpret the third clause of the FSIA to include the requirement that a
foreign state engage in some "legally significant act" in the United
States. 101 This narrower interpretation of jurisdiction prevents foreign
corporations from being drawn into tenuous lawsuits in the United
States. In addition, this prevention of unnecessary lawsuits is better for
foreign business relations. Further, the court decided that the Weltover
court's reliance on an immediate consequence test was a result of the
type of case and concluded that this requirement should not be some sort
of threshold requirement for the third clause of the FSIA.102 Finally, the
court rejected the legally significant act requirement because it thought

'direct effect' after Weltover. For the interpretation of "direct effect" after Weltover, see supra
notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
99 Id.; see also Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618, (rejecting the "foreseeable" or "substantial" tests).
Weltover announced that an effect was direct "if it follows as an immediate consequence of
the defendant's ...activity." Id. But see supra notes 71-85 and accompanying text for the
addition of a "legally significant act" standard after Weltover.
111Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 893-94; see also Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of
the Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375, 1387 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding a direct effect because a breach
of contractual obligation to provide legal defense resulted in a depletion of funds from an
American corporation in Arkansas); Grass v. Credito Mexicano, S.A., 797 F.2d 220, 221-22
(5th Cir. 1986); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101,1111 (5th Cir. 1985); Harris Corp. v.
Nat'l Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344,1351 (11th Cir. 1982)'(demanding payment
on a letter of credit issued by American bank causes direct effect in the United States
because it depletes that bank's funds); see also Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de Contratos,
923 F.2d 380, 390 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that the direct effect test was not satisfied because
the plaintiff was a Swedish corporation and all financial loss it had suffered affected
Sweden, not the United States).
101 Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 893-94; see also Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d
720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997) (defining a "legally significant act" as an act "giving rise" to the
cause of action); United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d 1232,
1239 (10th Cir. 1994), Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 35
(2nd Cir. 1993), General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1385 (8th Cir.
1993). For an analyzes of the legally significant act test, see supra notes 71-85 and
accompanying text.
102Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 893-94; see also, e.g., Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26
F.3d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618 (stating that an effect is direct if
it follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity and this need not be
"foreseeable" or "substantial").
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that adding such a clause would merge the third clause into the second
clause of the commercial activity exception. 103 Therefore, the VoestAlpine court concluded that jurisdiction was present over the defendant's
activity because it constituted a "direct effect" under the exact language
of the third clause of the FSIA. °4 This interpretation is a complete
departure from all other Circuits and prior decisions that will likely
cause many confusing interpretations' of the FSIA in the future and also
thwarts the goals of the statute. Thus, there is a need for Congress to
address the problem of vagueness in the "direct effect" clause and the
problems created by the Voest-Alpine decision.
C. Problems with the Voest-Alpine Interpretationof "Direct Effect"
The ultimate question that courts seem to consider when analyzing a
case under the FSIA is: Would Congress have wanted an American
court to entertain an action such as the present one?10 5 Given the
willingness of American corporations to devise lawsuits out of every
dispute, the harassment of foreign sovereign states would be
considerable by exposure to such a "direct effect" test designed by
Weltover that grants jurisdiction in almost every situation. 10 Therefore,
statutory clauses
limiting jurisdiction such as substantiality,
foreseeability, or a legally significant act requirement serve the valuable
goal of limiting jurisdiction over foreign defendants. 1' 7 The overall

13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. I111997) (requiring that the cause of action be

based upon (1) an act in the United States (2) in connection with commercial activity
outside the United States). Under the second clause, the act must give rise to the cause of
action or be legally significant and, therefore, becomes indistinguishable from the third
clause except, perhaps "that the third clause would also require proof of an act outside the
United States upon which the action is also based and which caused a direct effect in the
United States." Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 895.
104Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 896. For a discussion of the direct effect test which the court in
Voest-Alpine is affirming, see generally Weltover, supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
105See generally Weltover, 504 U.S. at 607.
106Id. For example, if a "broad" grant of jurisdiction was allowed under the FSIA, a
corporation could sue a foreign defendant for any slight monetary loss that affects the
American plaintiff even though a majority of the negotiations and business relations took
place in another country. This would anger foreign businesses and discourage further
business relations with the United States. By contrast, however, under a "narrow"
interpretation of the FSIA, jurisdiction of a suit involving an American plaintiff is granted
when there are "legally significant" acts in the United States during the business relations
of the parties involved. Overall, this approach prevents tenuous suits based on minor
effects in the United States.
107For an explanation of the "substantiality", "foreseeability", and "legally significant act"
requirements, see infra notes 146-54, 166-89 and accompanying text.
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consistent interpretations by the Circuit Courts after Weltover should not
be nullified by such cursory interpretations as the Voest-Alpine analysis.
The Supreme Court, when it abandoned the language that Congress
intended to limit the "direct effect" clause, failed to appreciate the fragile
balance required in sovereign immunity cases such as Colonial Bank v.
Compagnie Generale Maritime et Financiere.'0 In Colonial Bank, the court
applied the "legally significant" act requirement to best preserve notions
of comity and compensate those claimants who were injured by
international acts that produced substantial and foreseeable effects in the
United States. 109 In addition, the complete departure from the "legally
significant" act requirement in Voest-Alpine may also cause confusion
among courts in the future. By looking at the plain language of the
statute, the FSIA states that only a "direct effect" is necessary and
provides little guidance to the courts in its interpretation of cases. 10 The
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations, however, provides the additional
language of substantiality and foreseeability that Congress intended
when drafting the FSIA."1 This language, though, was later discarded
by the Supreme Court in Weltover." 2 Thereafter, the interpretation of a
"legally significant" act evolved into a common interpretation of the
FSIA by several Circuits." 3 Therefore, the need for a new, revised statute
with unambiguous language is essential for a uniform and consistent
interpretation of the third clause of the FSIA by all courts in the future.
This will also prevent our courts from becoming small international
courts of claims as a result of the broad grant of jurisdiction provided by
the Weltover court's analysis. Then, future courts that encounter the
"direct effects" test of the FSIA must think of an interpretation of the
language "direct effect" that adheres to the congressional intent of the
statute and does not grant jurisdiction to tenuous claims of U.S.
plaintiffs. Further, courts must also consider the possible confusion of

'0

645 F. Supp. 1457, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[The FSIA] seeks a balance between the

provision of a convenient forum for claimants aggrieved in commercial dealings with
foreign states and the promotion of comity and harmony between the United States and
other nations.").
109 Id.
110See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997). The statutory language does not
expressly state what a "direct effect" is, and is quite vague. See id.
III See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18(b)

(1965).

112Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.

For a discussion of the legally significant act analysis after Weltover, see supra notes 71-85
and accompanying text.
"3
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the FSIA's "direct effect" language with the "effects" test of the Sherman
Act that has very similar statutory language.114
IV. HISTORY OF THE "EFFECTS" TEST OF THE SHERMAN ACT AND
INSIGHTS FOR THE VOEST-ALPINE "EFFECTS" TEST

Both the Sherman Act" s and the FTAIA 116 have "effects" doctrines
that are strikingly similar to the FSIA. When applying these laws to
extraterritorial conduct, U.S. courts consider elements such as
"substantiality" and "foreseeability" to discern a direct effect in the
United States. 117 Because the interpretation of the language of these acts
is substantially similar to the FSIA, Circuit Courts may be confusing
jurisdictional tests under the Sherman Act and FTAIA with the "direct
effect" analysis of the FSIA. Therefore, this Section discusses the
evolution of the "effects" doctrine under the Sherman Act and proposes
ways to avoid confusion between the "effects" doctrine under the
Sherman Act and the FSIA.
A. Evolution of the "Effects" Doctrine in the Sherman Act & its
ExtraterritorialApplication
Enacted by Congress in 1890, the Sherman Act is the United States'
principal antitrust statute. 1 8 In 1909, in America Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co.,119 the Supreme Court held that U.S. antitrust laws could not
reach conduct outside the United States. 120 This is known as the

114 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 19 (1976) (revealing that the 'direct effect' test under the

FSIA is similar to the application of the Sherman Act).
11s

Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).

116Foreign

Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994).
For a discussion of the necessity of "substantiality" and "foreseeability" in the
interpretation of a "direct effect" under the Sherman Act and the FTAIA, see infra notes
123-25.
11 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1994). Other statutes that address the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law under the Sherman Act include: Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6a (West 1994); Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 22 (1994); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45() (1982); Money Laundering
Controj Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (f) (1994).
119213 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1909) (Holmes, J. ) (stating that a country has exclusive jurisdiction
over all persons, objects, and property within its territory).
120 Id. at 359. But see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 (1994) (stating that "[e]very contract, combination... or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations" is illegal); 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (stating that any monopolization, attempt to
monopolize, or combination or conspiracy with another to monopolize "any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations" is felonious); 15
U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994) ("Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade
117
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"territorial principle" by most scholars. 21 Although a monumental case
for early antitrust law, the territorial principle established in America
Banana has been gradually overruled by subsequent case law.' n Thirtysix years after America Banana, the Second Circuit in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America ("ALCOA") 123 established the "effects" doctrine
as the foundation for extraterritorial jurisdiction, interpreting the
Sherman Act. The ALCOA decision marked a significant advancement in
the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law. 124 The
ALCOA "effects" test, as stated by Judge Learned Hand, must include
both intent and actual effects. 25 Because some problems occurred as a
result of the different interpretations of the intent portion of the ALCOA

or commerce with foreign nations unless (1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and

reasonably foreseeable effect.").
121American Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 357; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF
LAWS § 9, cmt. f (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES § 20 (1965); see generally Marina Lao, JurisdictionalReach of the U.S. Antitnst
Laws : Yokosuka and Yokota, and 'Footnote 159' Scenarios,46 RUTGERS L. REv. 821, 826 (1994).
122See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("ALCOA"), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(allowing for the first time an extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act and establishing the
"effects test"); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949) (holding that
a violation of the Sherman Act requires a "direct and substantial effect" on U.S. commerce
and that more than a trivial effect must be shown); see also Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Mc Glinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802
(9th Cir. 1988); Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir.
1983); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982); National Bank
of Canada v. Interbank Card Assoc., 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Rio Algom, Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
affid 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1983); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp.
221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586
(E.D. Pa; 1974); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), affd (9th Cir. 1972); In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry, 186
F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
12M 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (per Hand, J.) (ruling that the Sherman Act may be applied to
conduct outside the United States where there is both an intent to affect and an actual effect
on U.S. commerce, even if such conduct is undertaken by foreign nationals).
124 Fortenberry, JurisdictionOver ExtraterritorialAntitnist Violations-PathsThrough the Great
Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519,529 (1971).
125ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 444 (emphasizing that both elements of the test must be met before
jurisdiction can attach). The "effects" doctrine, as a basis for jurisdiction, is not
controversial regarding acts such as shooting across a border. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402, cmt. d and reporters' note 2
(1987). Controversy generally arises when one country uses the principle to regulate trade
and economic activities outside its territory on the basis of their harmful economic effects
within its territory. Id.
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test, 2 6 Congress attempted to address the problems of arbitrary court
decisions under the Sherman Act by enacting the FTAIA. 127 Overall, the
courts have not been consistent in their application of the "effects" test
and have often applied it incorrectly.128 Courts that ignore the
"substantial and foreseeable" effects test of the FTAIA and the "direct"
effects test articulated in such cases as ALCOA and General Electric,

See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co. 395 F. Supp. 221, 226 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (stating that the required intent could "be satisfied by the rule that a person is
presumed to intend the natural consequences of his actions"); Sabre Shipping Co. v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that the
district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign defendants because United
States antitrust laws extend to any conduct "which affects the trade and commerce of the
United States."); United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949) (holding
that a violation of the Sherman Act requires a "direct and substantial" effect on United
States).
127 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1994). The act mandates use of a jurisdictional test which
requires a finding of "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect[s]" before
jurisdiction may be asserted in cases affecting the export trade of the United States. In
order to qualify under the act, the plaintiff must have personal jurisdiction as a prerequisite
in fairness to foreign industry. See generally Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604
(1990) (requiring that the defendant have "minimum contacts" with the forum to meet due
process requirements); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945);
World-Wide Volkswagon v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (requiring "purposeful
availment" and jurisdiction must be "reasonable"). The FTAIA specifically provides:
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than Import trade or import commerce) with foreign
nationals unless(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce
w/ foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce
with foreign nations; or
(B)on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations,
of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the U.S.;
and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of [the
Sherman Act], other than this section. If [this Act applies] to such
conduct only because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B); then
[this Act] shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export
business in the United States.
15 U.S.C.A. § 6a (1994).
128 See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962);
Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586,587 (E.D. Pa. 1974); United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr.,
Inc., 134 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F.
Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891
(D.N.J. 1949); and United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D.
Ohio 1949), nodified and affd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). These cases provide examples of the
confusion in applying the "effects" test of the Sherman Act. Id.
126
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however, are certain to render decisions that will both anger foreign
businesses and embarrass the United States.12 9
With the enactment of the FTAIA in 1982, Congress enacted a much
more narrow requirement of "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable" effects for jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct. 130
Further, many courts also consider issues of comity when deciding
whether to grant jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.'31 After the
enactment of the FTAIA in 1982, the court in Eurim-Pharmv. Prizer,Inc.132
applied the new "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" effects
which reveals that the new Congressional standard is much more clearly
articulated. 133 Overall, through this new test, the courts can apply a
12See, e.g., in re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. 111.1979), remanded, 617
F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980) (asserting jurisdiction without considering either intent or
effects).
130See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988). For the
text of the Act, see supra note 125. See also H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No.
686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 43 Antitrust And Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1076, at 306-07 (Aug. 5, 1982) (recognizing the lack of a jurisdictional standard and
proposing that the purpose of the amendment was to promote American exports). See
generallyRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 18 (1965).
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs outside of its territory and causes
an effect within its territory, if either-

(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as
constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that
have reasonably developed legal systems, or ....
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of
activity to which the rule applies;
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct
outside the territory; AND
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably
developed legal systems.
Id.
131 See,

e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). Comity is "the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens." Id. See also In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 490 (N.D.
Cal. 1989), rev'd & remanded, 938 F.2d 919, 933-34 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying the "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" effects test to litigation over foreign individuals
and considering notions of comity).
132593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
133 See id. at 1106 n.4 (stating that the "reasonable foreseeability" test examines "whether
the effect would have been evident to a reasonable person making practical business
judgments, not whether actual knowledge or intent can be shown"). In Pfizer, the act
lacked a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on either U.S. imports and
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uniform standard and, if the interests are substantial, then comity
interests cannot quash jurisdiction.134 This standard of "substantiality"
and "foreseeability" of direct effects to invoke jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act and FTAIA may be used in comparison to the FSIA's
"direct effect" test, which is causing confusion in Circuit Courts today, in
order to glean unambiguous language that should be applied after VoestAlpine under the FSIA.
B. Possible Confusion: "Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable" Test
under Both Doctrines and FutureApplication
Both the "substantiality" and "foreseeability" direct effect test that
establishes extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act and the
FSIA's direct effect test have similar interpretations and intents; both
tests wish to preserve comity and prevent tenuous claims against foreign
defendants that threaten foreign business and commercial relations. 135 In
addition, the inclusion of more specific terms such as "substantiality"
and "foreseeability" in order to determine whether an effect is direct
enough to establish jurisdiction is similar in both instances and has
similar results for plaintiffs and defendants. 136 Because the two doctrines

exports, but the plaintiffs argued that the act had a spillover effect on US domestic
commerce through the effect of higher prices for the drug in the US. Id.at 1106. The term
"reasonably foreseeable" is defined in case law, which cites the legislative history of the
amendment. Id. The terms "direct" and "substantial", however, are not explicitly defined.
Id. Overall, the ALCOA test is probably less restrictive than the FTAIA standard requiring
a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" anti-competitive effect on commerce.
See also Lao, supra note 120, at 827-28.
134See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,922-25 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (analyzing foreign interest and policy concerns only if the "direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable" effects test of the Sherman Act is met in order to ensure that all
market participants are subject to the same rules); see also U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, reprinted in 55 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391 (Nov. 17, 1988). Footnote 159 to this Guideline states that
although the Sherman Act extends to foreign "conduct that has a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on the export trade or export commerce of a person engaged
in such commerce in the U.S., the Department is concerned only with the adverse effects on
competition that would harm U.S. consumers by reducing output or raising prices." Lao,
supra note 120, at 826.
1- For a discussion of the elements of "substantial" and "foreseeable" effects under the
FSIA, see supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. For the most recent articulation of the
"substantial" and "foreseeable" reqtufements under the Sherman Act and FTAIA, see, for
example, supranotes 113-23.
13 For a discussion of the "narrow" view of "direct" effect analysis after Weltover versus
the more "broad" view of jurisdiction under the FSIA applied by courts such as Weltover
and Voest-Alpine, see supra notes 87-113 and accompanying text. Under a "narrow" view,
courts are more likely to deny jurisdiction and prevent our courts from becoming
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are so similar and have overlapped throughout history, Circuit Courts
may have confused the language of both statutes in their applications.
Additionally, both doctrines (FSIA "effects" test and "effects" test of
Sherman Act) have nearly identical tests and goals, a new statute that
provides a new test for future courts should be drafted only after close
analysis of the language and development of both tests. Finally, a new
statute should be drafted in light of the effects that different language
and interpretations have on the outcome of the jurisdiction under the
FSIA because it severely affects plaintiffs, defendants, and the U.S. court
37
system.
V. PIOPOSED STATUTE: A UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF THE FSIA's
"EFFECTS" TEST
After Voest-Alpine, 138 the Circuit Courts' interpretations of the FSIA's
"effects" test conflict because of various other interpretations of a
necessary "legally significant act" in other Circuit Courts. 139 This return
to the broad interpretation of Weltover received much criticism because it
allows plaintiffs to bring many international claims in U.S. courts, no
matter how distant the "effect." 140 The existing commercial activity

international courts of claims which anger foreign litigants. Id. Under a "broad" view,
courts are more likely to grant jurisdiction to most plaintiffs who feel that they have been
harmed by a foreign defendant. Id. This view most often ignores issues of comity and
jeopardizes further business conduct abroad by angering foreign officials. See supra notes
117-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the extraterritorial application of the
"effects" doctrine under the Sherman Act. The Courts, beginning with the Banana case,
established a "narrow" view that denied jurisdiction to any foreign litigants. Id. Then, the
courts began to overrule this standard with more "broad" standards of jurisdiction which
confused the courts. Id. Finally, another more "narrow" view of jurisdiction was formed
through the enactment of the FTAIA. Id.
137 For example, a broad grant of jurisdiction like the "immediate consequences" test of
Weltover grants jurisdiction in almost every case and causes our courts to become
international courts of claims which is costly. For a discussion of Weltover's "immediate
consequences" test, see supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
1M8142 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 1998).
139 For a discussion of a "legally significant" act requirement for direct effect, see supra
notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
140 For a discussion of the "immediate consequences" test of Weltover that grants "broad"
jurisdiction to plaintiffs, see supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. See also Steven
Anthony Torres, Comment, InternationalLaw - Foreign Sovereign inmunities Act-Argentina's
Default on Bonds Payable in New York Found Sufficient To Deny Inmunity, 16 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 761 (1993) (identifying the "immediate consequences" standard as
"less precise" and reasoning that the "substantial and foreseeable" test would promote
uniformity among the Circuit Courts); Avi Lew, Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.:
Interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act's Commercial Activity Exception To
Jurisdictional Inmunity, 17 FORDHAM IN'IL L.J. 726, 764 (1994) (stating that the Second
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exception combines the questions of immunity and personal jurisdiction
to determine whether the foreign defendant meets one of the FSIA's
three standards for personal jurisdiction. 141 However, many courts find
this approach to jurisdiction and immunity for commercial activities
creating a "direct effect" confusing. 42 The third clause of the FSIA states
that the United States should have jurisdiction over acts that cause a

Circuit's application of the U.S. Supreme Court's Weltover standard for commercial activity
leads to inconsistent conclusions); Nicolas J. Evanoff, Direct Effect Jurisdiction under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Ending the Chaos in the Circuit Courts, 28 HOuS. L.
REV. 629 (1991); Donoghue, supra note 29; Richard Wydeven, The Foreign Sovereign
imunities Act of 1976: A Contemporary Look At Jurisdiction Under the Commercial Activity
Exception, 13 REv. LrTG. 143 (1993) (concluding that under the "direct" effect test of the
FSIA a court will not find subject matter jurisdiction unless the activity has some "legally
significant" contact with the United States that is usually contractual).
141 See, e.g., Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,307
(2d Cir. 1981) (creating three questions for jurisdiction: (1) Is the action "based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by [a] foreign state?" (2) Is the action
based upon an "act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of [a] foreign state elsewhere?" (3) Is the action based upon an act outside the
territory of the United States, in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere, yet "caus[ing] a direct effect in the United States?"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e)
(1994) (defining "commercial activity carried on in the United States" as " commercial
activity... having substantial contact with the United States").
142 See Donoghue, supra note 29, at 524-25 (stating that courts may unnecessarily reach
complex immunity questions by deciding immunity before determining personal
jurisdiction). The discussion of Weltover, supra Section II.D.3, illustrates the difficulty that
courts face in attempting to apply the FSIA's minimum contacts requirement. For example,
the court held for the first time that failure to make payment on bonds that called for
payment in New York constituted a "direct effect" in the United States. See supra notes 6670 and accompanying text. This established jurisdiction under the third ("direct effects")
clause of § 1605 (a)(2). Id. According to Professor Carlos Vazquez, this two-step approach
improperly bifurcates the inquiry: "The courts should be interpreting the direct-effect
clause in light of the due process clause's minimum contacts requirements and should find
the commercial-activities exception satisfied only if the forum-related activities on which
the action is based are sufficient in themselves to satisfy due process." Carlos M. Vazquez,
The Relationship Between the FSIA 's Comnercial-Activities Exception and the Due-ProcessClause,
85 PRoc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 257, 259 (1991). See also Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de
Contratos del Comite Ejecutivo General del Sindicato Revolucionario de Trabajadores
Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana, S.C., 923 F.2d 380, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the only relevant acts for purposes of jurisdiction under the FSIA are those acts that form
the basis of the plaintiff's complaint); America W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877
F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the commercial activity relied upon by the
plaintiff must also be the activity upon which the lawsuit is based); Zedan v. Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing to grant jurisdiction over the
breach of contract for work performed in Saudi Arabia because "Ulurisdiction would
extend to any and all disputes between Zedan and Saudi Arabia subsequent to the phone
call, merely because but for that call Zedan would not have traveled to Saudi Arabia").
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"direct effect" in the United States. 143 However, the courts have
interpreted the "direct" effect language three different ways throughout
the history of the FSIA: (1) "substantial and foreseeable" acts;'" (2) acts
that cause an "immediate consequence" in the U.S.; 145 and (3) "legally
significant" acts. 146 Therefore, these tests must be analyzed based upon
the effects they have on jurisdiction, notions of comity, congressional
intent, and immunity before a new statute is crafted.
A. Examining the Tests and Application to Hypothetical
By analyzing the "substantial and foreseeable" acts test, the
"immediate consequences" test, and the "legally significant" acts test
and comparing their effects on jurisdiction, scholars may critique each
outcome and decide which test is better based on notions of comity,
congressional intent, and the goals of sovereign immunity. This Section
provides analysis and critique of these tests by applying the tests to the
hypotheticals proposed at the beginning of the Note.
1. "Substantial and Foreseeable" Acts
After the 1976 enactment of the FSIA until the Weltover case in 1991,
most courts adopted a "substantial and foreseeable" test to determine a
"direct effect" for jurisdiction. 47 In addition, the "substantial and

14I See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1997). This codifies the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity by providing:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case-

(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States.
Id. (emphasis added)
144See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
146See supra notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
147See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text; see also America W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA
Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1989); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d
445 (6th Cir. 1988); Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1987); Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d
1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1984);
Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982);
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foreseeable" test is in accordance with the legislative history of the FSIA
and section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations. 48
According to numerous courts, this standard is persuasive authority. 1 49
By applying this standard to cases, many scholars have revealed that this
test grants a "narrow jurisdiction" to plaintiffs in most scenarios and
preserves the sovereign immunity of defendants most correctly under
the commercial activity exception of the FSIA. 5 0 For example, in the case
of the shareholder who has a contract with Nigeria in Section I.A. of this
Note, the shareholder would not be able to bring a lawsuit against the
foreign defendants in the United States under a "narrow" interpretation
with the requirements of "substantiality" and "foreseeability" because
the transfer of funds into the bank account in New York was a limited,
last minute transaction. 5 1
In addition, in the case of United World Trade who had a contract
for oil with the MOP in Section I.B of this Note, it was not a foreseeable
or substantial harm in the United States for MOP to deny payment.
Therefore, jurisdiction would not be granted in either hypothetical
because the elements of "substantiality" and "foreseeability" are not met.
Overall, this analysis is better for the United States because the U.S.
plaintiff in this suit has quite tenuous claims against the foreign
defendant. Moreover, such claims would violate notions of comity and

Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
148 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18

(1965); see also supra note 53-60 and accompanying text. The House Report 94-1487
specifically states that the third clause of the FSIA ("direct effects" test) should be
consistent with the principles of the Restatement. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6618.
Therefore, Courts, after the enactment of the statute, most often applied the "substantial
and foreseeable" analysis to determine "direct effect" in order to create uniformity among
Circuits. The Second Circuit, however, did not adhere to this analysis. See supra notes 6670 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 57-58.
150 See Evanoff, supra note 61 (defining the "broad" and "narrow" views of interpretation of
"direct effect" under the FSIA). A more "narrow" interpretation is more likely to promote
extraterritorial business relations because foreign individuals will not have to worry about
being subject to many lawsuits outside their country unless there is a just reason and
substantial, direct act in the United States. Id.
1-1 In the facts stated in Section 1, the transfer of the funds to El Surtidor's bank account in
New York, rather than the Cayman Islands, was not a "foreseeable" or "substantial" part of
the contractual relationship. Therefore, it is better for business relationships and notions of
comity if the lawsuit is brought somewhere else with "substantial" effects on the
contractual arrangement such as Nigeria or Mexico (headquarters of the Mexican
corporation, El Surtidor del Hogar). See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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52
discourage foreign business relations with U.S. citizens in the future.
A statutory requirement of "substantiality" and "foreseeability" should
not be adopted, however, except as a secondary consideration under the
"direct effect" analysis of the FSIA because it can be easily confused with
the "direct, substantial, and foreseeable" analysis of sufficient effects
under the Sherman Act and FTAIA.153

2. Acts that Cause "Immediate Consequences" in the U.S.
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court established an "immediate
consequences" analysis for the "direct effects" test of the FSIA.1s4 This

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES,
(1987) (articulating a "reasonableness" inquiry for jurisdiction).
The
"reasonableness" inquiry turns on a number of factors including the extent to which the
activity takes place within the territory of the country wishing to assert jurisdiction or has a
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory. § 403 (2)(a) (1987). See
152

§ 403(1)

also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws, § 37 (1971). "'Judicial Jurisdiction' may

be exercised by a state over conduct outside its borders with effects in the state unless the
nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship to the state make the exercise of
such jurisdiction unreasonable." Id. See also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)
(stating that "comity" is "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens"). If most of the
acts or contractual relations take place outside the U.S. in a given claim, then it would not
make sense to assert jurisdiction over that foreign defendant. This, in a sense, is the
"narrow" interpretation of the "direct effect" analysis of the FSIA until Weltover. See supra
notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
15-1For a complete discussion of the "effects" test under the Sherman Act and the FTAIA of
1982 which both require "substantial and foreseeable" acts in order to qualify under the
"direct effect" analysis, see supra notes 113-35 and accompanying text. This language
dealing with the extraterritorial jurisdiction of claims based on the Sherman Act is so
similar to the "direct effect" analysis of the FSIA that it may be confusing Circuit Courts.
See supra notes 113-35 and accompanying text.
154 See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992); this "immediate
consequences" standard was criticized by many scholars. See, e.g., David E. Gohtke,
Comment, Clearing the Air or Muddying the Waters? Defining a "Direct Effect in the United
States" Under the Foreign Sovereign Imunities Act After the Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
18 Hous. J.INT'L L. 261 (1995) (criticizing Weltover because it grants broad jurisdiction over
foreign officials in U.S. courts); Keith Highet, Foreign Sovereign Imunity-Commercial
Activity of a Foreign State Havinga Direct Effect in the United States, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 820, 823
(1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court's acceptance of the "immediate consequences" test
will broaden jurisdiction under the FSIA); Steven Anthony Torres, International Law Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-Argentina's Default on Bonds Payable in New York Found
Sufficient to Deny Imunity. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1991)., 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 761, 770-71 (1993) (arguing that the "immediate

consequences" analysis causes inconsistency and constitutes a misinterpretation of
legislative intent); Avi Lew, Comment, Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.: Interpretingthe
Foreign Sovereign imnunity Act's Commercial Activity Exception to JurisdictionalImmunity, 17
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decision departed from the interpretations of all Circuit Courts, in
addition to a departure from the elements of "substantiality" and
"foreseeability" required by Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations. 55
Further, at least one scholar has labeled this
"immediate consequences" test as the "broad" interpretation of the
"direct effects" test under the FSIA.156 By applying this test.to cases after
Weltover,15 7 courts have realized that this test grants jurisdiction to
plaintiffs in almost every case and, consequently, does not preserve
sovereign immunity.158 For example, in the case of the shareholder who
did not receive funds in New York as anticipated,15 9 a court which has
adopted the "broad view" of the FSIA's "direct effect" analysis, like
Weltover, will grant jurisdiction because it has the "immediate
consequence" of depriving a U.S. citizen of funds in the United States. 60
Similarly, in the case of United World Trade who did not receive

funds in New York from the oil company in the second hypothetical, 16'

the U.S. court that applies the "immediate consequences" analysis will
grant jurisdiction because of the lost funds in a New York bank.
However, such a "broad" interpretation of jurisdiction violates notions

FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 726 (1994) (recognizing that the Weltover standard leads to inconsistent
conclusions).
'55 For a discussion of the requirements of "substantiality" and "foreseeability"
in the
legislative history of the FSIA and the courts before Weltover, see supra notes 53-65 and
accompanying text.
156 See Evanoff, supra note 61, at 63940 (describing the Second Circuit's rejection of the
substantiality and foreseeability requirements as the "broad view" of jurisdiction). This is
labeled as the "broad view" because it grants broad jurisdiction to plaintiffs in their claims
against foreign defendants, based on whether the act has any sort of "immediate
consequence" in the U.S. Id. This grants jurisdiction over any effect, no matter how small
or tenuous the claim in most cases. Id.
157 See Commercial Bank v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
bank's obligation to pay in New York for accounts is a "direct effect" under the broad
interpretation of Weltover); Antares Aircraft v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 36
(2d Cir. 1993) (applying a "legally significant" act analysis to determine direct effect instead
of an "immediate consequences" analysis); United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil
Prod. Ass'n, 821 F. Supp. 1405 (D. Colo. 1993), affd, 33 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that the phrase "direct effect" is very ambiguous); Ampac Group, Inc. v.
Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973, 977 (S.D. Fla. 1992), affid, 40 F.3d 389 (11th Cir.
1994) (holding that an effect need only be "slight/ tangential" to qualify under the FSIA's
"direct effect" analysis).
158See Golilke, supra note 155 (criticizing Weltover because the new "immediate
consequences" test grants such broad jurisdiction over foreign officials in U.S. courts and
violates notions of comity).
159 For the facts of this hypothetical, see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
160See supra note 135.
161 For specific facts of the case, see supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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of comity by exercising jurisdiction over almost any foreign defendant
162
and will likely turn our courts into international courts of claims.
Therefore, this ambiguous language of "immediate consequence" should
not be adopted in the future because of the negative effect it has of
granting plaintiffs jurisdiction over foreign defendants in almost every
suit. This, in turn, angers foreign businesses and prevents them from
engaging in business with the United States, which was not Congress's
intent when drafting the commercial exceptions of the FSIA. 163 Finally,
this approach violates notions of comity.' 64
3. "Legally Significant Acts"
Because of the ambiguity and unpredictability of the "immediate
consequence" test of Weltover, the Tenth Circuit in Mangyshlakneft
adopted a more narrowly tailored test of "direct effect" through the
addition of a "legally significant act" to the FSIA analysis. 65 Then, in
1994, the United States Supreme Court added a "legally significant act"
requirement in Antares Aircraft that is much more restrictive than the
"immediate consequence" standard.1 66 After these decisions, many other
Circuit Courts adopted the "legally significant act" as a more reasonable
standard. 67 In order to establish jurisdiction and a direct effect under

162

For a discussion of the varied and unpredictable application of the "immediate

consequence" analysis of Weltover, see supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text. Overall,
U.S. courts are not meant to resolve every dispute that has a foreign defendant and has an
effect in the United States. If this were the case, then U.S. courts would become
overwhelmed with international cases and, in effect, would become international courts of
claims.
163For a discussion of legislative intent of the "direct effect" clause, see supra Section II.D.1.
164 See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (defining the meaning of comity
and emphasizing the importance of not overburdening other nation's citizens through
extraterritorial lawsuits). See also supra note 130.
165United World Trade v. Mangyshlakneft, 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994) (denying
jurisdiction to the plaintiff by applying the legally significant act standard even though
domestic corporation did not receive funds). See also supra notes 71-85 and accompanying
text.
l6 999 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994) (adding the legally significant
act to replace the Weltover analysis). See also Richard Wydeven, The Foreign Sovereign
Imunities Act of 1976: A Contemnporary Look at Jurisdiction under the Comn~nercial Activity
Exception, 13 REv. LrrG. 143, 166 (stating that the "legally significant" act approach in
Antares is more restrictive than an "immediate consequences" standard). See also supra
notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
167 See, e.g., Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997); Goodman
Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143,307 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166,
307 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard Rubin, 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993); General
Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1993); Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales v. Republic
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this test, the plaintiff must show that something "legally significant"
actually happened in the United States. 168 This analysis is much more
narrowly defined than the "immediate consequences" standard for
direct effect established in Weltover, which is quite broad and grants
unlimited jurisdiction. 169 Because the "legally significant act" test is
more narrowly defined, it compliments the goals of Congress of
respecting the autonomy of other nations and not subjecting foreign
defendants to unsubstantiated lawsuits in the United States.170
Further, by applying the "legally significant act" analysis to the U.S.
shareholder in the hypothetical at the beginning of this Note,17 ' a court
would likely rule that Nigeria's lack of payment of five million dollars to
El Surtidor's bank account in New York constitutes a "legally
significant" act that has a "direct effect" in the United States. However,
the court would likely rule that a conversion of foreign currency at a
New York bank in the second hypothetical would not constitute a
"legally significant act" in the course of the party's contractual
relations. 172 Thus, the court ensures that the plaintiff states a significant
claim against a foreign defendant by clearly stating a "legally significant
act" that requires the jurisdiction of U.S. courts (i.e., lack of payment in a
negotiated and substantial contract). The specific language of the
"legally significant act" analysis to determine direct effect also preserves
notions of comity because it is narrowly tailored and foreign defendants
should be responsible for commercial activity which directly affects the
United States through legally significant acts. 17 Overall, the "legally
significant act" test best preserves the goals of Congress in the enactment

of the Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1992); WMW Machinery v.
Wekzeugmaschinenhandd, 960 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Granville Gold Trust v.
Comnissione del Fullimento/ Interchange Bank, 924 F. Supp. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Coleman
v. Alcolac, 888 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Reed v. Donai Bank, 866 F. Supp. 750
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Kao Hwa Shipping Co. v. China Steel Corp., 816 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); Maizus v. Weldor Trust Reg., 820 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
168 See, e.g., Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1527 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a direct
effect is established only if the plaintiff shows that something "legally significant" occurred

in the United States). See also stpra notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
169 See Wydeven, supra note 77, at 166 (stating that the "legally significant act" is much
more restrictive). It was a test that was also more uniformly and universally applied
among the Circuit Courts after Weltover. Id. See also supra notes 71-85 and accompanying
text.
170 See supra notes 27-85 and accompanying text.
1I For specific facts in this case, see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
17 For a description of the contract between United World Trade and MOP, see supra notes
4-7 and accompanying text.
173 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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of the FSIA and notions of international comity. Therefore, it should be
adopted in statutory form in order to prevent further confusion among
the Circuit Courts such as Voest-Alpine.' 74
B.

Draftinga New Statute For "Direct Effect"

The current "direct" effect clause of the FSIA states that jurisdiction
is granted upon: "an. act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
that act causes a direct effect in the United States." 1 5 This Note proposes
to add the "legally significant act" requirement in the statute as the best
interpretation of what constitutes "direct effect." 176 As a result, this new
language should extinguish the Circuit Court's confusion of the "direct
effect" test by explicitly stating what "direct effect" means in the FSIA. 177
The amended statute would state the following:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States
inany case(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign State elsewhere; or upon a legally significant
act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
State elsewhere and that legally significant act causes
a direct legally significant effect in the United
States.17s (new language is italicized).
Courts will also likely use the "substantiality of conduct" and
"foreseeability" of conduct 79 to determine whether the act was "legally

'7

For a discussion of the Circuit split caused by Voest-Alpine, see supra notes 86-112 and

accompanying text.
375For the complete text of the FSIA, see supranotes 27-85 and accompanying text.
176 For an explanation of why the application of "legally significant act" analysis is the most
coherent, see supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
177For identification of Circuit Court confusion, see supra notes 53-85 and accompanying
text.

I- See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(2) (1988).
179For a discussion of the "substantiality" and "foreseeability" test, see supra notes 145-51
and accompanying text.
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significant," but this language should not be articulated in the statute
and should be a secondary inquiry for courts because it is easily
confused with the Sherman Act and FTAIA. 18 Overall, the "legally
significant" act requirement clarifies the ambiguity of the "direct effect"
clause of the FSIA by providing a uniform test for all courts to apply that
specifically states that a "legally significant" act causes a "direct effect"
in the United States.
C. Effects of New Statute on Interpretation.
This new requirement of a "legally significant" act provided in the
revised statute clarifies the FSIA which will lead to more uniform
interpretations of direct effect in the Circuit Courts in the future.181 In
addition, the inclusion of a "legally significant" act is a more "narrow"
view of "direct effect" analysis than the interpretations in Weltover and
Voest-Alpine that is better for preserving international business
82
relationships abroad and respecting notions of international comity.1
Because of this more clarified statute, plaintiffs are also discouraged
from bringing unsubstantiated claims under the FSIA against foreign
defendants that often harass foreign businesses and discourage further
extraterritorial conduct.
Thus, this interpretation is better for foreign business and does not
overload U.S. courts with international claims because the "legally
significant" act analysis limits jurisdiction in U.S. courts. 8 3 If the new
"legally significant" act requirement is applied to the shareholder
mentioned in the illustration at the beginning of this Note,184 the court
would likely grant jurisdiction and determine that Nigeria caused a
"direct effect" in the United States because of the "legally significant" act
of never paying the plaintiff five million dollars in the New York bank

180For

an explanation of the "substantiality" and "foreseeability" requirements
determining effects sufficient for jurisdiction under the Sherman Act and FTAIA, see supra
notes 113-35 and accompanying text.
181For a discussion of the "legally significant" act analysis and its effects in case law and
application to hypotheticals, see supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
182See supranotes 163-72 and accompanying text.
183By requiring the "legally significant act" to show direct effect, a plaintiff must actually
prove in his/her complaint that something legally significant occurred in the United States
which is a more difficult standard than the "immediate consequences" standard of Weltover
that granted jurisdiction to almost all plaintiffs. For differences between the two analyses,
see supra notes 145-72 and accompanying text.
IN For specific facts of this hypothetical, see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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account.185 Overall, this revised statute incorporating the language of a
"legally significant" act constituting "direct effect" will create more
uniform results in the Circuits, promote international business relations,
preserve notions of comity, and prevent our courts from becoming
international courts of claims. Further, there will be less confusion
between the "effects" test of the FSIA and the "effects" test of the
Sherman Act and FTAIA after this revision. 86
VI. CONCLUSION

Until the Fifth Circuit's decision in Voest-Alpine, courts interpreted
the "direct effect" exception of the FSIA to include a "legally significant"
act in the United States that constitutes "direct effect." 87 By retaining
the standard of "immediate consequences" of Weltover, the Fifth Circuit
created a split among Circuits and confused the meaning of "direct
effect" under the FSIA. 88 Throughout the history of the FSIA, this
confusion resulted from the ambiguous language of "direct effect" in the
statute. 189 Therefore, legislators and courts must adopt a uniform test or
form a revised statute of the "direct effects" test under the FSIA such as
the "legally significant act" analysis presented in this Note in order to
prevent further confusion in the future. 190 For example, such revision is
necessary in order to prevent "broad" interpretations like the Weltover
analysis that anger foreign businesses and prevent further extraterritorial
negotiations. In addition, the "legally significant act" language causes
less confusion with the "substantiality"
and "foreseeability"
requirements of the Sherman Act and FTAIA while preserving the goal
of limited jurisdiction under the "direct effects" test of the FSIA. Finally,
this limited grant of jurisdiction under the "legally significant act"
revision also prevents our courts from becoming overloaded with

1" This is the most just result because the plaintiff expected a "legally significant" act to
occur in the United States; therefore, the plaintiff should be entitled to jurisdiction in the
United States and recovery under the "legally significant" act test that determines a "direct
effect."
186See supra Section IV. The revision, which does not include elements of "substantiality"
or "foreseeability" except as secondary inquiries under the Restatement, prevents confusion
with the Sherman Act and the FrAIA.
17 For a discussion of the Voest-Alpine, see supra notes 86-114.
188For a discussion of the Voest-Alpine, see supranotes 86-114.
189See supra Section 11. See also supra note 1.
190For the revised statute articulated in this Note, see supra Section V.
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tenuous claims by plaintiffs. Thus, this approach preserves America's
judicial efficiency.
Heidi L. Frostestad
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